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To: Mamdani Transition & Housing Policy Team
From: Seth Glasser and Shaun Riney, On Behalf Of Underserved Tenants
Re: A Pragmatic Framework to Stabilize Housing, Protect Tenants, and Restore Supply
Date: January 12, 2026

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Executive Summary

New York City’s rental housing system is currently defined by conflict, distrust, and policy gridlock. The result has been predictable: deteriorating buildings, warehoused apartments, rising market rents, and growing pressure on tenants and housing providers alike.

The Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act of 2019 (HSTPA) was passed with the intent of protecting tenants, but in practice it has also eliminated basic economic incentives to maintain, improve, and reinvest in large portions of the city’s housing stock. This has contributed to widespread disrepair, financial distress, and a sharp reduction in available rental units—particularly in rent-stabilized buildings.

If the Mamdani administration’s goal is to create, preserve, and improve affordable housing, a new approach is required—one that protects tenants, prevents displacement, and realigns incentives so that private housing providers are motivated to reinvest rather than withdraw.

This memo proposes a Rental Housing Peace Plan: a set of targeted, tenant-centered reforms that cost neither tenants nor taxpayers, increase supply, fund Legal Aid, restore tenant equity, and stabilize the housing ecosystem without encouraging evictions or deregulation.

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Guiding Principles

This framework is built on the following commitments:

  1. Minimal cost to tenants.
  2. Minimal cost to taxpayers.
  3. Increased housing supply, especially in rent-stabilized stock.
  4. Incentives for housing providers that do not rely on eviction or displacement.
  5. Dedicated funding for Legal Aid to protect tenants from harassment and unlawful eviction.
  6. Restoration of tenant equity and freedom of choice.
  7. Long-term growth and improvement of the housing stock.

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The Problem We Are Trying to Solve

The current system unintentionally incentivizes:

  • Warehousing vacant units
  • Deferring maintenance
  • Avoiding reinvestment
  • Exiting the rental market entirely

It removes incentive for:

  • Rehabilitation
  • Capital improvements
  • Accepting subsidized tenants
  • Long-term stewardship

This is not a moral failure on either side—it is a structural incentive failure. No housing system can survive when the only rational economic behavior is neglect or abandonment. The consequences are being borne by tenants in the form of unsafe conditions, shrinking supply, and rising market rents.

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The Rental Housing Peace Plan

  1. Vacancy Reset with Continued Rent Stabilization

Allow rent-stabilized units that are or become vacant to reset to market rent while remaining under rent stabilization, provided that:

  • The unit is fully remediated for lead and safety issues
  • The apartment passes Section 8 and HPD habitability standards

Purpose:
This brings thousands of warehoused units back online, improves safety conditions, and increases supply without deregulating apartments.

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  1. Landlords Fund Legal Aid

If a rent-stabilized unit has been occupied by the same tenant for 10 years or more and subsequently becomes vacant:

  • The landlord may reset the rent to market
  • The landlord pays a tax equal to the first month’s registered rent
  • That tax is paid directly to Legal Aid

Purpose:
This recognizes tenant stability as a public good and converts turnover into a funding stream for tenant protection.

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  1. Separate Pre-1974 Buildings for RGB Increases

Require the Rent Guidelines Board to calculate increases for pre-1974 buildings separately, recognizing the vastly different cost structures, capital needs, and physical conditions within the rent-stabilized stock.

Purpose:
This enables more precise, evidence-based policy rather than a one-size-fits-all increase.

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  1. Legal, Transparent, and Taxed Buyouts
  • All buyouts must be registered with DHCR
  • A 5% tax on buyout amounts is dedicated to Legal Aid
  • Anti-harassment standards apply fully, with strong enforcement

Purpose:
This restores tenant equity, increases transparency, and allows voluntary, mutually beneficial agreements while protecting against coercion. Those who get paid to leave help fund the protection of people that want to stay.

Tenants should not be treated as lacking agency. In every other sector of the economy, individuals are allowed to negotiate the value of their interests. Housing should not be the sole exception.

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  1. Incentives to Accept Subsidized Tenants

Allow landlords to collect above the legal rent when placing subsidized tenants (Section 8, PHEPS, etc.) in buildings.

Purpose:
This removes the financial penalty for accepting vulnerable tenants and expands real access to housing for voucher holders.

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  1. In-Occupancy Improvements (Reinstated IAI for Voluntary Upgrades)

Allow tenants in rent-stabilized apartments to request improvements during occupancy, with:

  • Rent increases capped at 2.5% of money spent (1/40th rule)
  • Example: $10,000 improvements to rent stabilized unit = $250/month rent increase
  • Tenant to provide for their own relocation during construction (if needed)
  • Excludes repairs which are mandated by rent stabilization – applies only to true improvements

Purpose:
This improves quality of life for tenants and modernizes apartments without displacement.

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  1. Reinstatement of MCI and J-51 via Property Tax Abatement

Reinstate Major Capital Improvement (MCI) and J-51 programs, but:

  • Repayment to owners occurs through property tax abatements
  • Not through tenant rent increases

Purpose:
This enables building-wide upgrades, energy efficiency, and safety improvements without burdening tenants.

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Anticipated Benefits Of The Rental Housing Peace Plan

  • Increased supply: Thousands of warehoused rent-stabilized units return to the market
  • Improved conditions: Real incentives to remediate lead, mold, and structural issues
  • Restored tenant equity: Tenants regain the ability to benefit from the value of their tenancy
  • Lower insurance costs: Stabilized revenue improves underwriting and reduces risk
  • Higher property values: Sustainable models encourage reinvestment rather than abandonment
  • Increased tax revenue: Through transfers, permits, and economic activity
  • Job creation: Construction, trades, and professional services expand
  • Alignment of incentives: Good actors are rewarded; bad actors are isolated

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Anticipated Costs & Downsides

  • Increased administrative workload for DHCR and HPD
  • Potential legal challenges from stakeholders opposed to any HSTPA modification
  • Risk of abuse by bad actors requiring strong enforcement
  • Political opposition from groups resistant to any rent movement

These risks are mitigated by transparency, continued stabilization protections, anti-harassment enforcement, and reinvestment of revenues into Legal Aid and tenant protections.

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Conclusion

This is a peace plan, not a giveaway. It keeps rent stabilization intact. It strengthens tenant protections. It restores basic economic functionality. It brings housing back online.

Most importantly, it moves New York City out of ideological trench warfare and back into governance.

The housing crisis will not be solved by choosing sides. It will be solved by designing systems where the best outcome for tenants is also the rational outcome for housing providers.

That is what this plan seeks to do.